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STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE

>

Respondent, owner of a surface estate, counterclaimed for
damages when Appellant, holder of an oil and gas lease, brought
this action

for an order restraining and

enjoining Respondent

from interfering with Appellant's establishment of an
gas well drill site.

~

~—

oil

and

—

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The

lower court

restrained and

enjoined Respondent from

interfering with the-establishment of the well site and then awarded judgment against Appellant in the amount of$16,542.00
and interest for the use of lands in connection with establish-,
ing the drill site.
~:

^

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

-

Appellant seeks to have this Court reverse the judgment for
daimages and remand the

case to the district court for new find-

ings and entry of a new judgment consistent with the requirements
of the law and the terms of the Oil and Gas Lease involved.
K

STATEMENT OF FACTS

In 1961, Respondent, Anthon Rust

and

his wife,

Ona Rust-,

purchased the land involved in this case from Gilbert and Ethel
Beebe.

The Rusts, however, did not purchase or acquire any min-
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eral rights with the property.
1974, Pages 83 & 84)

(TR. of Hearing, January, 28,

The Beebes reserved from the sale to the

Rusts all gas, oil, and other mineral rights,

The conveyance

to the Rusts was made by Warranty Deed and after the description of the property in the deed, the following language was
inserted:

"Reserving therefrom all gas, oil, and other miner-

al rights'1.

(Exhibit 2)

In 1964, Gilbert and Ethel Beebe

granted to Shell Oil Company an oil and gas lease on the property.

(Exhibit 3)

Appellant, Flying Diamond Corporation,

then acquired the interest of the lessee, Shell Oil Company, by
a Farm-Out Agreement and proceeded to prepare to drill a gas
well.

(TR. of Hearing, January 28, 1974, P.15)
The Utah Oil and Gas Conservation Commission has promul-

gated a spacing order for the particular oil and gas field in
which the land in question is located, requiring that an oil ;
or gas well be drilled within a 660-foot radius of the center of the Northeast quarter of each section.

(TR. 113)

In

the Summer of 1973, Plaintiff's engineer, Mr. Reese, and an
independent land man hired by Plaintiff, Mr. Wheatley, went
to look at possible locations for drilling a well.
113)

(TR. 38 &

The area within the permissible limitations of the spa-

cing order was viewed and examined, and after walking the area
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tnd taking into account the circumstances existing there, it
ms determined that the only feasible location for a well would
>e on Defendant's property where it was eventually placed.

(TR.

.13 & 116)
The decision to place the well there was based on the fact
:hat the land at that location is higher in elevation than at
tny other location within the area allowable under the spacing orler.

(TR. 40)

To put the well to the South of the present site

on Respondent's land) or to the West (on another landowner's
property) would have cost up to an extra $40,000.00

(TR. 39 &

14) doubling the cost of setting up the location.

The engineer

n charge of establishing the location, Mr. Reese, testified
hat the cost of establishing the location elsewhere within the
rea allowed by the spacing order would have been very costly
s fill would have to be obtained from some distance away due
o the wet and swampy conditions.

(TR. 116)

No contradictory

estimony was presented by Respondent.
The safety of the men working at the location was also taen into account by Mr. Reese who testified about the danger inolved when heavy equipment is located on lands without a solid
ooting.

(TR. 114) Mr. Reese further testified that he con-
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sidered the existing water flow patterns in determining the
location of the well site and access road and placed them where
there would be the least amount of interference with water flow*
(TR. 114)

The land where the well was placed is a high spot

and was covered with sage brush and rocks.

(TR. 40)

The well

was located on the only place within the area allowed by the
spacing order which was not covered with grass and other feed
for cattle which would have been destroyed by the establishment
of the location.

(TR. 40)

Once the well location was determined, alternative methods
of access to the location were considered and discussed with
the Respondent.

The decision to locate the road where it was

actually built was supported by the following reasons:
(a) The present route is the shortest distance "from
the well location to an adequate county road.
(TR. 33 & 34)
(b) The construction of a road from the North to the
well location would have required building a road
through a swampy area, at great additional expense.
(TR. 40, 49, 50, 51, 52, & 53)
(c) A road from the North would have interfered substan-4Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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When it became clear that Respondent intended to refuse
Appellant's crew a right to enter at any location, it was decided to go ahead without further attempts to secure Respondent's cooperation.

On January 8, 1974, Appellant took equip-

ment to the area to commence working on the site, but was prohibited by Respondent from entering upon the property.

(TR. 16)

On January 13, 1974, a crew of men returned to the area and
started to construct a road into the property.

(TR. 16)

On

January 13, 1974, a crew of men returned to the area and started
to construct a road into the property.

The Respondent arrived

shortly thereafter with the Duchesne County Sheriff who required
the Appellant to obtain a court order before entering upon the
property.

(TR. 16) A temporary order restraining the Respondent

from interfering with Appellant's operations was promptly secured,
and a preliminary injunction pending the outcome of the suit was
entered at a hearing subsequent to that time.

The road and the

well location were then built by the Appellant in January of 1974.
In December 1974, eleven months after the well site was
built, Respondent filed its counterclaim and raised its claim
that the use made by Flying Diamond Corporation was "not reasonably necessary to any legitimate purposes of" Appellant.

-6-
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^CK^kivNi; ON APPLICABLE LAW
AN 01.., AND ! -AM- LESSH1- IS ENTITLED TO USE THE SURFACE 01- THE
PREMISES EMBRACED BY ITS OIL AND GAS LEASE WITHOUT LIABILITY
FOR SURFACE DAMAGE CAUSED BY ITS OPERATIONS ON THE LEASEHOLD,
SO LONG AS SUCH USE AND THE MANNER OF ITS EXERCISE ARE REASONABLY NECESSARY TO EFFECTUATE THE PURPOSES FOR WHICH THE LEASE
WAS MADE.
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Dakota, West Virginia, Illinois, and Canada.

No cases applying

any other rule are cited.
The writers who have treated this subject concur unanimously in supporting Appellant's position on the law.
example:
1962;

See for

4 Summers Oil and Gas, Section 652, Permanent Edition,

1 Williams and Meyers, Oil and Gas Law, Section 218.7;

2 American Law of Property, Section 10.28;
Mining, Volume I, Section 3.50;
Law Institute, 85.

American Law of

and 1 Rocky Mountain Mineral

L. Sellers, "How Dominant is the Dominant

Estate, Or, Surface Damages Revisited11, Thirteenth Annual Institute Southwest Legal Foundation^ 377.

T. J. McMahon,

"Rights and Liabilities with Respect to Surface Usage by Mineral Lessee", Sixth Annual Institute Southwest Legal Foundation,
231.
A cause of action for damages by a surface owner against
a mineral lessee must proceed either on a theory of tort and
negligence or a theory of contract and breach of covenants.

An

oil and gas lessee may injure land, crops and improvements without responding in damages if no tort or contractual liability
can be shown.

53 ALR 3d 16 at 33, and cases cited there. As

stated at Page 31 of 53 ALR 3d:
-8-
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• •. !f
i n cases involving alleged damages r?n the
surface of the leasehold, the legal princI pie'employ, ed by the courts as a starting point for a determinant.;.
of the problem is that an. oil and gas lease creates and
vests in the lessee ;ne dominant estate ". •••*.• surface
of the leasehold for the attainment: of i he ! *. Ultimate
purposes of the lease, the holder of the d u n m a n t estate
being permitted to occupy such space and do such damage
as i s reasonably necessary to CUIKIUC t t.-'c operations
permitted by the lease, because the lessor. through
the mineral lease, authorized by implication such con-.
duct by the 1 essee, and no recovery is allowed ioi
damage resulting from, authorized conduct. '1 hus , it
. is often stated that an oi 1 <•••<! ;*v- lessee jt~ entitled to use the surface of the premises embraced by
his oil and gas lease without liability for surface
damage caused by his operations on the leasehold, so
long as such use and the manner of i ts exercise are
•A,,, reasonably necessary to effectuate the purposes for
, .. .
,f
'. whi ch the 1 ease was made
The ^

u r c

j

e n

^s

0n

t|ie

s u r f a c e o w n e r to s 1 low t:hat: the owr ie r

of the mineral i nterest was excessive i n his use of the surface
<

'*

t I n eg "I igeiil: des true t: 1 on ncci :i i: red

vice_Oii C o ^ v s , Dacus , 325 P. 2d, .1035 (Okla ) 1 958;
LL.

i-

-.I. . MU -J <± Li:

Queer- City Oil Co
/

3 6 8 Ok ] a

Cities.. ,Ser-,
Mar land

51 8, 3 ' i I '.. 2 < :! 21 8 (] 9 34 ) :; No rum vs .

I \ont. 527, 264 P. 1 22 (] 928);
. . rous cases therein ci ted

and. 53
It: i s nec-

essary to specify and prove specif ic acLo oi ac^»! { ecutL in order
for the surface owner to recover f~r damages rrr.s ,, v-* 5-1 .^-•1
and gas lessee's excessive su*-1;*

.s: ..

. anc
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Rights of Surface and Mineral Owners, 7 Baylor L.Rev. 188, 191
(1958).

See also 53 ALR 3d 16 at 35 and 36.

To sustain a cause

of action based on alleged negligence, the Plaintiff must prove
not only negligence but also proximate cause.

Hurley vs. Nor-

thern Pacific Railway Company, 455 P.2d 321 (Mont. 1969).
The surface owner is not entitled to compensation for the
minerals taken or the use made of the surface.
Oil Co. vs. Kieffer, 277 U.S. 488 (1928);

Kinney-Coastal

Holbrook vs. Contin-

ental Oil Co., 73 Wyo. 321, 278 P.2d 798 (1955).

The severence

of the mineral and surface interests places a servitude on the
surface.

This servitude or implied easement has the same'effect

as if the parcel of land were sold with an easement expressly
reserved, and the effect is that the surface and mineral owners
are co-tenants of the property.

Since the mineral interest is

the dominant interest, the owner thereof is entitled to possess
so much of the surface as is necessary to explore for and extract the minerals.

The surface is not taken in the sense spo-

ken of in condemnation suits, instead the mineral owner uses his
implied easement to occupy so much of the surface as is necessary for as long as there is exploration or production.

When

those activities cease, the mineral owner's rights cease and sur-
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±u

face owners operations would be giving him a more valuable estate than the one he originally contracted to buy.
.

:

'

ARGUMENT
•*•-'

I .

/

'

-

THE OIL AND GAS LEASE PROVISION THAT LESSEE SHALL "PAY FOR
DAMAGE DIRECTLY AND IMMEDIATELY CAUSED BY ITS OPERATIONS TO
GROWING CROPS THERETOFORE PLANTED ON SAID LAND11 DOES NOT ENTITLE THE SURFACE OWNER TO BE COMPENSATED FOR THE USE OF THE
LAND.
Paragraph No. 1 of the Oil and Gas Lease held by Respondent provides in pertinent part as follows:
" . . . . Lessor . . . has this day granted, demised,
leased, and let, and hereby grants, demises, leases,
and lets exclusively unto Lessee for the purpose of
investigating, exploring, and prospecting, by geophysical and other methods, and drilling, mining and
operating for and producing oil, gas, casing-head
gas, and casing-head gasoline, laying pipelines, building tanks, stations, power lines, telephone lines and
other structures thereon to find, produce, save, store,
treat, transport, and take care of all such substances,
* and for housing and boarding employees in its operations on said land or adjacent land . . . . !l
There appears to be no question that the mineral lease involved authorizes the holder thereof to establish a well site and
build an access road to it as was done by Appellant in this case.
Any liability on the part of Appellant to compensate. Respondent
for having built the road and well site must be based, then, on
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of the law that so long as the use made of the surface by the
lessee of the mineral interest is reasonable there is no liability for damages, the court found that the Defendants were
entitled to compensation for the reasonable value of the land.
The court then found the fa,Ir market value of the land and awarded damages in that amount.
At times, a deed, patent, lease or other instrument will
contain specific language to require payment of damages for
such things as growing crops.

These matters are the subject

of negotiation between buyer and seller at the time the transaction takes place.

Language representative of that used in

patents and other conveyances is found in Paragraph No. 10 of
the Oil and Gas Lease before the Court in this case, which provides that the lessee shall pay "for damage directly and immediately caused by its operations to growing crops theretofore
planted on said land.11
Because of the general use of the term "growing crops11
in patents, leases and other instruments relevant in land and
mineral law, this term has been reviewed by the courts and has
:

a well established meaning.

For example, Black's Law Diction-

ary, Deluxe Fourth Edition, defines crops as follows:

-14-
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can find that the 5.88 acres of surface 'taken1 for
the well site and the road was in excess of that reasonably necessary, or that its use by the Plaintiff is
unreasonable to accomplish the purposes contemplated
for the lease."
'
The Court then, in Paragraph No. 4 of the Memorandum Decision,
stated:
"Defendant is entitled to compensation for the reasonable value of the 5.88 acres of land taken for
the well site and road under Paragraph No. 10 of the
lease dated April 6, 1964.fl
The Court then referred to the requirement of Paragraph No. 10
that damages to growing crops be paid and stated that it found
that the lands used for the road and drill site had thereon growing crops.

The Court then held that because the use of the land

under the drill site and road was denied to the surface owner
that the measure of the value of the growing crops was the fair
market value of the land.
The specific language of the lease reads:

ff

. . . and

shall pay for damage directly and immediately caused by its
operations to growing crops theretofore planted on said land.11
(Emphasis added)

The fact is that there were no growing crops

on the properties involved when the well site and road were
built.

(TR. 16 & 17)

The ground was covered with two feet of
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snow. Any reasonable construction given the word "growing"
rules out assessing damages for crops which might be planted
in the future as the Court did here. Also, what do the words
"theretofore planted" mean?

They can reasonably be said to mean

those crops planted prior to the point in time when the use was
made of the surface by the oil and gas lessee.

Furthermore, the

only testimony concerning the planting of any plants was that
Defendant had "throwed some grass seed on all my pastures".
(TR. 84 & 85)

Likewise, are we to ignore the words 'directly

and immediately caused1?

The trial court did.

There is no tes-

timony as to the value of any crops growing at the time of construction because there were no growing crops.

It was winter,

furthermorer Mr., Gerber testified that he looked and was unable
:o find any stand, of tame or seeded grasses on the lands, but
:ound instead native or wild grasses interspersed with sagebrush.
'TR. 140) Grasses and forage are not usually considered crops
md then only when they are seeded or harvested annually.

AM- "

estimony of damages presented by Respondent related to damages
o land, not to growing crops, and Appellant has voiced its dispproval of this "eminent domain" approach to the case continuusly since the pre-trial conference in this action when it saw

-17-
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that the court might adopt such a concept;.

(TR. 30)

To ill-

ustrate how far from "growing crops theretofore planted on said
land" and "directly and immediately11 damaged, the trial court
went in its decision one need only consider that the rationale
used by the court to require compensation here would equally
apply if the land involved were non-agricultural, for example,
a parking lot. Whether the owner of the surface estate is deprived of the use of land, the test used by the trial court is"
simply an impermissible judicial rewriting of the lease agreement.

No justification of the use of that test can be found

in the language of Paragraph No. 10 of the lease.

The error

which the court below fell into is caused by its failure to
adhere to the language of the agreement or to distinguish between an eminent domain case where the test used might be permissible, and the case at hand where the mineral lessee is actually a co-owner of the property and owns a right to use so
much of the surface as is necessary to develop his dominant
estate.

The lower court appears to have forgotten completely

that it expressly based its decision that compensation was due
for 5.88 acres on Paragraph No. 10 of the lease.
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It leaped to

the conclusion that damages assessed should be based on denial of
use.

The court even used the language of eminent domain and re-

fers to lands as being "taken".
When by contract the parties have agreed that the surface^
owner will be paid damages for growing crops, the method of calculating damages is well established.

The measure of damages for

injury to growing crops is the potential value of the crop as it
stood on the ground at the time and place of its destruction, the
yalue at the time of the loss" being determined by the probable r
yield of the crop when matured and its reasonable probable market value when matured, less the probable future production
:osts of cultivating, harvesting, transporting and marketing, -:ities Service Gas Company vs. Christian, 340 P.2d 929 (Okla.
L959);

53 ALR 3rd 16 at 53. Furthermore, damages are awarded <

>nly for the crops on the land actually used by the lessee in
.ts operations.

See for example Frankfort Oil Co.- vs. Abrams,

.59 Colo. 535, 413 P.2d 190, (1966), where the trial court allowed damages for depreciation in the value of thePlaintifffs
•anch as a unit, but the Supreme Court of Colorado reversed
nd held that damages were only applicable to the lands actu-
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* ,

ally used by the lessee in the operations.
In the case of the language in the lease before the Court,
the damages allowed are only those "directly and immediately
caused to growing crops theretofore planted.11

Because of the

eminent domain concept asserted by Respondent and the Court's
adoption of those concepts, the only evidence before the Court
was to do with land values.

Not one sentence of testimony was

presented by Respondent with respect to the value of crops
growing on the land.

Appellant respectfully submits that the

judgment of the court below should be reversed and the case be
remanded for entry of new findings, that no evidence was presented on the issue of damages to growing crops.

: ,

A ROAD PERMITTING ACCESS TO THE DRILL SITE ESTABLISHED BY
APPELLANT WAS REASONABLY NECESSARY AND APPELLANT ACTED REASONABLY IN LOCATING AND CONSTRUCTING THE ROAD IT BUILT.
In the absence of an express provision in the lease to
the contrary, the location of wells, access roads and the necessary facilities is to be determined by the oil operator,
not by the surface owner.
Co., 152 SW2d 711, 724;

Gulf Oil Corp. vs. Marathon Oil

Stephenson vs. Glass, 276 SW 1110;

Hoffman vs. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 260 SW 950; Felmont Oil

-20-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

)

Corp. vs. Pan American Petroleum Corp,, 334 SW2d 449, 456.

The

general rule on the question; is stated in the following quotation from a California case:
"If a particular facility is necessary and convenient
to the operation of the oil and mineral owner, it may
be placed anywhere upon the surface area in which he
has the right of user, so long as such, placement, is
reasonable under prevailing conditions and even though
such placement in particular instances may work a hardship on the surface owner. ,. Wall vs. Shell Oil Company,
209 Cal. App. 2d 504, 25 Cal.Rptr. 908, 911."
At Page 915, the California Court in Wall further stated: ...._.
11

. . . ... No owner of a particular surface division
could be heard to assert that the particular placement of a facility was unreasonable solely because it
,/could have been placed elsewhere just conveniently."
The courts have specifically held that the issue is not a question of inconvenience to the surface owner, and to so instruct
a jury is error.

Getty Oil vs. Jones, 470 SW2d 618, 53 ALR 3d

1 at 14 (Tex. 1971).

To hold otherwise would be to say that the

nineral estate is not really the dominant estate.

Notwithstand-

ing the overwhelming case authority on this point, the trial
:ourt in this case in its Memorandum Decision dated July 1, 1975,
rhich was incorporated into its Findings of Fact and Conclusions
>f Law at Paragraph No. 1 thereof stated in pertinent part:

-21-
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"The location of the road where it was located was
not reasonably necessary, and unreasonably interferes with the surface owner's pre-existing use of
the surface . . .fl
In order to prevail on the issue in this case under the
correct interpretation of the rule of law, Respondent has the
burden of showing that Appellant in the establishment of the
well location and the road, and in operating its facilities,
used an amount of property in excess of that reasonably necessary, or that it caused destruction by its wanton and negligent
conduct.
1958.

Cities Service Oil Co. vs. Dacus, 325 P.2d 1035 (Okla.)

Marland Oil vs. Hubbard, 168 Okla. 518, 34 P.2d 278 (1934)

Norum vs. Queen City Oil Co., 81 Mont, 527, 264 P. 122 (1928);
and 53 ALR 3rd 16 at 49, and numerous cases therein cited.

No

evidence before the Court shows that Appellant used more land
than necessary for the operations allowed by the lease.
trial court so found.

The

There is no evidence that Appellant was

negligent in selecting the location of the access road to the
well site.

The evidence is clear that Appellant made a careful

and professional analysis of the alternatives available for the
establishment of the well location and the road, and the record
is void of testimony by any person who even studied the alterna-
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tives other than Appellant's engineers arid construction people
who found the well and road location not only reasonable, but
the most reasonable.
Appellant's case below was based on the contention that the
drill site and road should have been placed off Respondent's
property and on that of a neighbor's in the wet, swampy area to
the south of the present location,This contention is made despite the obvious extra expense, risk to safety of men and equipment, and substantial disruption of water flows the other location would entail.

The only reason given in support of this con-

tention is that Respondent would have preferred it since he did
not own the mineral rights.

No evidence is before the Court

that would indicate that the choices made by the Appellant were
unreasonable under the circumstances.

There is no evidence that

a reasonable oil and gas operator would have done anything different than-Appellant did.

Decisions as to where to drill oil

wells and build roads required to carry heavy equipment where
heavy equipment and mens' lives are involved are made by highLy trained engineers and not by farmers or lawyers.

Gulf Oil

:orp, vg. Marathon Oil Co., 152 SW2d 711, 724; Stephenson Y S ,
Mass, 276 SW 1110; Hoffman vs. Magnolia Petroleum Co.,-£60
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SW 950; Felmont Oil Corp. vs. Pan American Petroleum Corp.,
334 SW2d 449, 456.
Respondent has not met his burden of showing that what
was done by Plaintiff was unreasonable.

It is not Appellant's

burden to support the reasonableness of the location of the
access road but that of Respondent to show it unreasonable.

The

evidence indicates that Appellant considered the alternatives
and picked the only location feasible for both the well site and
the access road, and further that every reasonable effort was .
made to get along with Respondent in arranging and establishing
the location.

Appellant has cooperated with fencing, attempted

to help with irrigation problems, established cattle guards,
and has otherwise conducted itself in a very reasonable and professional manner, doing many things which it was not obligated
to do under the law.
The road built for access to the well site was calculated
to interfere with water flow in the least possible manner reasonably consistent with the necessities of the project.
114)

(TR.

To have built the road from the north would have inter-

fered with the southeasterly flow of water toward the entire

w

eastern eighty acres of Respondent's property rather than just

-24-
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the fifteen acres which the court below found affected.

(TR. 47)

Although the trial court failed to state what reasonable alternatives to locating the access road it thought available, It
is assumed that it concurred with Respondent's preference stated
at trial that it be built from the north along the fence.
of Hearing, January 28, 1974, P. 46;- also, TR. 54 & 66)

(TR.
The

court found that thelocation of the road disrupted the flow of
water to the southern fifteen acres of Respondent's property.
Both Appellant's witnesses (TR. 40, 67 & 114) and Respondent
himself testified that the flow of the water north of the well
site was southeasterly.

To build the road where Respondent

asked that it be built would have disrupted the flow of water
to eighty acres, not just fifteen acres.

(TR. of Hearing,

January 28, 1974, P. 60) Appellant considered that fact in locating the road as well as the fact that the road would have to
De built through a swamp, at great expense, (TR. 48, 49, 50, 51,
>2, & 53) that a county road would have tro be improved so as to
landle the increased traffic and a bridge would probably have to
>e replaced at great expenses-.

(TR. 114, 115 & 116) There

appears-to be no dispute in the evidence that if Appellant had
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built the road on the line from the north along the fence as
desired by Respondent, Respondent would have been affected substantially more as concerns water flows than with the road

at

its present location.
Appellant considered all of these factors in its decision.
Apparently the trial court disagreed with Appellant's conclusion as to where the road should be located.
is not the test.
or wanton.

That, however,

The test is whether Appellant was negligent

Neither is the test that urged by Respondent in the

lower court that the facilities be constructed so as to inflict
the least possible damage upon the surface estate.

To carry

that position to its logical extreme could require use of a
helicoptor or an elevated road built on stilts for access to
the well location.

Although the lower court did not expressly

say it was using the test of "least possible damage" only by
that test could the court reach the conclusion it did on the
basis of the evidence before it.

The Court did expressly refer

to the test as the "possible alternative" rule.

The correct

test is whether Appellant acted reasonably as a reasonably prudent operator would act.

There is a substantial difference be-

tween a test requiring Appellant to act reasonably and a test
-26-
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requiring it to adopt a possible alternative inflicting the
least possible damage upon the surface.

Under the correct test

and the evidence before the Court, there can be no question but
that Appellant acted within its rights and that no damages may
be assessed.
From the commencement of the discussions between the Appellant and the Respondent regarding the establishment of a well location, Respondent took.the position that Appellant had, without authority to do so, attempted to commence a condemnation
action, that a hearing of immediate occupancy.was required, and
that a bond must be obtained and a sum of money paid to Respondent before Appellant had any right to go on the lands.

(TR.

2,9) See also Defendant's Memorandum of Authorities dated February ,1, 1974, submitted to the Court arguing that the temporary
)rder restraining Respondent from interfering with Appellant's
operations should be immediately dissolved and that Appellant be
equired to bring an eminent domain proceeding or depart from
he premises.

(TR. of Hearing, January 28, 1974, P. 12)

The

ourt at that time properly denied Respondent's request and coninued the protective order against Respondent's erroneous and
ibending position that Appellant had no right to go on the pro-27Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

perty without first paying Respondent.

Coupled with that position

was Respondents unreasonable view that the Appellant must com<
pensate Respondent in amounts ranging between $60,000.00 and
$90,000.00 for the 5.88 acres of sagebrush pasture used for the
well location and the road crossing less than an acre of hay pasture.

See Defendant's counterclaim praying for damages in the a-

mount of $91,000.00.

Faced with Respondent's unreasonable posi-

tion and the fact that the Oil and Gas Lease imposed upon Appellant the obligation of drilling or forfeiting the lease, Respondent took the only course reasonable under the circumstances:
first, Appellant attempted to discuss the matter with Respondent;
second, it commenced work on the project;

and, third, when re-

quired by Respondent, it obtained a protective court order. Under this set of conditions, Appellant had to judge for itself
without any cooperation from Respondent such things as where to put culverts, cattleguards, roads and gates.

The attitude of

Respondent is one of the circumstances which the Court should
consider in determining whether Appellant's acts were reasonable
at the time.
Not until after the trial (See TR. 29) and in his Trial
-28Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Memorandum did Respondent concede that the Appellant might have_
some rights to go on the property without buying it as in an eminent domain proceedingsbut he still persisted in quoting eminent domain statutes and discussing the case in terms of a
"taking for public use" and performing in the manner causing
"least possible injury" to the surface.

(See Defendant:^Mem-

orandum datedMay 1, 1975 at Page 8) Using the concepts and language of eminent domain law led the lower court here into error
as it did the trial court in Getty Oil vs. Jones-y 470 SW2d 618,
53 ALR 3d 1 at 14 (Tex. 1971), iri which the court stated that it
was reversible error to make inconvenience to the surface owner
an issue, and in Frankfort Oil Co. vs. Abrams, 413 P.2d 190 (1966)
159 Colo. 535, where the trial court was reversed for awarding <
damages for depreciation of a ranch as a unit as is done in eminent domain cases. The trial court, however, was improperly in*fluenced by these eminent domain concepts and included in its
Memorandum Decision and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
such concepts as a "taking" and "depreciation of the value of
nearby lands" and damages to growing crops in the amount of
"the"fair market value of the lands." The judgment of the trial
court should be reversed and the case remanded for-application ^

-29-
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of correct principles.
III.
APPELLANT IS NOT LIABLE TO RESPONDENT FOR ANY DAMAGES CAUSED
BY A BREACH OF ANY COVENANT, CONDITION OR OBLIGATION EXPRESS
OR .IMPLIED UNTIL SIXTY DAYS AFTER RESPONDENT HAS GIVEN WRITTEN
NOTICE SETTING OUT SPECIFICALLY IN WHAT RESPECTS IT IS CLAIMED
THE LEASE AGREEMENT HAS BEEN BREACHED.
Respondent has claimed damages alleging a breach of lessee's
obligation to act reasonably in locating its facilities and operating them.

Appellant submits that if Respondent is to claim the

benefit of the provisions in the Oil and Gas Lease, he should be
required to comply with the terms of the lease himself with regard to the required notice, thus affording Appellant an opportunity to remedy any such breach.

Paragraph No. 13 of the lease

provides in pertinent part as follows:
H

v

. . . . In the event lessor considers that lessee
has not complied with all its covenants, conditions,
or obligations hereunder, both express and implied,
lessor shall notify lessee in writing setting out
specifically in what respects it is claimed that
lessee has breached his contract, and lessee shall
not be liable to lessor for any damages caused by a
breach of any such covenant, condition, or obligation, express or implied, accruing more than sixty
days prior to the receipt by lessee of the aforesaid written notice of such breach.11

Respondent has not given notice, written or oral, to Appellant:
specifying breach of covenant under the lease.

-30-
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To the contrarry,

Respondent first disclaimed anything to do with any lease.

The

trial court imposed upon the Appellant the obligation to pay for
damages to Respondent's lands finding Appellant acted unreasonably in locating the access road where it did, but the court failed to require Respondent to meet the condition precedent to such
compensation by giving notice and sixty days within which to correct the situation.

See Getty vs. Jones, 470 SW2d 618 (Tex.)

where a similar provision was found in the lease involved and
where the court ordered that time be given to correct any deficiency in the lessee's activities. Appellant should be given an
opportunity for sixty days to remedy any problems which it may
have caused by acts contrary to or unauthorized by the provi- ,.
sions of the lease which Respondent claims to be a third party
beneficiary.

Specifically, time to relocate the road or remedy

the interference to the irrigation system if it is found to unreasonably interfere.
. , : , *

i

v

.

,•

-

•>•••

-

-

•:,••.•-•

WHILE APPELLANT DOES NOT AGREE THAT GETTY OIL CO. VS. JONES
GOVERNS OR SHOULD GOVERN THE DISPOSITION OF THIS CASE, THERE
IS NO EVIDENCE BEFORE THE COURT TO SUPPORT THE AWARD OF DAMAGES FOR LOCATION OF THE ACCESS ROAD EVEN IF THE RULE OF THE
GETTY CASE IS FOLLOWED.
^
......
7,
The trial court in the instant case stated that it adopted
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the general concept of the Getty case as to the relative rights
of the surface and mineral owners. ~

^-,*. • ..

-- In Getty Oil Co. vs. Jones, 470 SW2d 618, (Tex. 1971), Jones,
the surface owner of a tract of land, sued for an injunction to
restrain Getty Oil Company, an oil and gas lessee, from using
vertical spacefor two beam-type pumping units, one 17-feet
high, and the other 34-feet high.

Because of their height, the

pumps precluded the use of Jones automatic irrigation sprinkler system.

Upon trial, the jury found that it was not reason-

ably necessary for Getty to install pumps that prevented the operation of;:the irrigation system.

The trial court then grant-

ed Getty1s motion for Judgment Non Obstante Veredicto om the

ru,.

ground there was no evidence that Getty used more lateral surface
than reasonably necessary.

—•- . —

Upon, appeal, the Supreme Court of Texas first held that,
the reasonably necessary limitation extends to the superadjacent airspace as well as to the lateral surface and subsurface
of the land.

Getty argued that the. placement of ttLe. beam-type

pumping units on the surface was authorized by the lease as a
matter of law.
fallows.:

The court then stated the issue to be decided as

;: — - < *

r

^*
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"The question to be resolved, then, is whether evidence may be entertained to show the effect of Getty's
manner of surface use upon the use of the surface by
Jones, together with the nature of alternatives available to Getty, in resolving the issue of reasonable
necessity.11
The majority of the court in the Getty case confirmed that
it is:
"well settled that the oil and gas estate is the dominant estate in the sense that use of as much of the
premises as is reasonably necessary to produce and remove the minerals is held to be impliedly authorized
by the lease".
The court recognized that in some cases there may be only one
manner of use of the surface whereby the minerals can be prorduced and that in such a case the lessee has the right to pursue this use, regardless of surface damage.

The court went on

to say that where there is an existing use by the surface owner
which would be precluded, and where under the established practices in the industry there are alternatives available to the
lessee whereby the minerals can be recovered, the rules of reasonable usage of the surface may require the adoption of an alternative by the lessee.
* n Getty, the surface owner, Jones, presented testimony
that a critical shortage of labor available to farms in the area
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necessitated the use of automatic sprinkling equipment in irri- +
gating the land.

A petroleum engineer, a witness for Jones, tes-

tified as to the costs of the construction by Getty of cellars for
the housing of the two pumping units and as to their feasibility.
He also testified with regard to the installation of a different
kind of pump which could have been used to avoid the interference with the use of the automatic sprinkler irrigation system.
Another witness for Jones was a pumper for another oil company
who was at the time operating two beam-type pumps in cellars and
twenty-five beam-type pumps on the surface.

He testified that

less maintenance was necessary on the unit

in the cellars than

on the ones on the surface and that there was less leakage of
hydrogen sulfide gas.

Jones1 evidence showed that there were a-

vailable to Getty two types of pumping installations which were
reasonable alternatives to its present use of the surface, neither of which precluded the use of the existing irrigation system, and that two other oil companies were currently employing
those alternative methods under their leases on other portions
of Jones1 tract of land.
The court said in determining whether the use made of the
surface by the mineral lessee is reasonable the trier of fact

-34-
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could consider the use being made by the servient surface owner,
as one of the factors in determining whether the use is reasonable.

"*

On motion for rehearing the court stated:
"If the manner of use selected by the dominant mineral *
lessee is the only reasonable, usual and customary method
that is available for developing and producing minerals
on this particular land then the owner of the servient
estate must yield. However, if there are other usual,
customary and reasonable methods practiced in the industry on similar lands put to similar uses which would not
interfere with the existing uses being made by the servient
surface owner, it could be unreasonable for the lessee to
employ an interfering method or manner of use.11
The trial court in Getty was reversed because the jury
instruction called for a weighing of the evidence of harm or

,

—

inconvenience to Jones against the considerations pertaining to

-

Getty.

The Court specifically held that the test is not one of

inconvenience to the surface owner and to suggest so in a jury
instruction is reversible error.

The case was sent back to the

trial court for re-trial with a proper jury instruction and with
the instruction that in the event it was found that Getty was
making an unreasonable use of the surface, Getty would have the
right to install non-interfering" pumps whereupon it would not be liable
for permanent damages to the land.
-35Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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•

The Getty decision has been a controversial one.

Two judges

vigorously dissented arguing that the majority had made the dominant estate servient and the servient estate dominant by not
holding as a matter of law that the use of the beam-type pumping
units were authorized by the lease. Motions for rehearing were
filed twice and the court filed an opinion on one of them further
elaborating and justifying the decision.

No less than four separ-

ate opinions were written by the Supreme Court of Texas in deciding
the case and handling the confusion and uproar following the decisj
Shortly after Getty the Texas Supreme Court decided the case
of Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 15, Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 394, 483, SW2d
808 (1972).

The Sun case involved the use by the mineral lessee,

Sun, of subterranean water in its waterflood operation.

Sun ar-

gued that it had the right to free use of the water on two theories:

(1)

the implied right of mineral lessee to use such part

of the surface as was necessary to effectuate the purposes of
the lease, and (2)

the express provision in the lease granting a

free right to use of water.

The Texas Court held, that Getty did nc

apply to this fact situation, but that it would only apply to a
case where there was a reasonable alternative method available to
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the lessee on the premises.

The court went on to hold that it

need not decide if the express contract provision applied because Sun had the implied right to free use of so much of the
freshwater in question, as.may be reasonably necessary to produce the. oil from its wells. This implied grant was implied by
law in all conveyances of a. mineral estate and could not be altered by evidence that the parties to a particular instrument of
conveyance did not intend the legal consequences of the grant unless an express limitation on the grant was stated in the conveyance.

,

The court held that the.use of fresh water was reasonably;
necessary to effectuate the purposes of the lease because Sun's
attempts to use available salt water had failed, there was no
other source of water on the premises, and to require Sun to buy
water from other sources or owners of other tracts in the area
would be in derogation of the dominant, estate.

Behind the de-

cision in the Sun case is the reasoning that to require the holder of the dominant estate tQlppk for help off his premises would
demean the dominant estate;

the tail would be wagging the dog.

Under the facts it was determined better public policy to limit
the alternatives the lessee would have to, consider, to those
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Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

available without going off the premises to secure resources
which were available on the premises.
In its Memorandum Decision of July 1, 1975, the trial court
in the instant case in Paragraph No. 3 thereof adopted an approch somewhat similar to that in the Sun case with regard to alternatives for locating the well site and said that the rule
should apply only to alternatives on the premises. When it
came, however, to the location of the access road it: did not
refer to this same limitation.
It should be remembered that the Getty case represents an
extension in Texas of what has been the law in all states which
have decided the issue. As the law stands in 17 of the 18 jurisdictions considering the issue, in order for a mineral lessee
to be liable to a surface owner for surface damages, the surface
owner has the burden of bringing an action in negligence, or in
the alternative, charging that the lessee has used more space '/;••
than is reasonably necessary to effectuate the terms of his lease
The Getty case added the concept that the pre-existing use of
the surface, and reasonable alternative methods of use, were factors which could be considered in determining whether the lessee
acted reasonably in determining how much surface to use.
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Getty

dealt

entirely with the amount of surface used;

i.e., vertical

space and the question of whether the lessee used more space
than reasonably necessary.

Getty said nothing with regard to

the action based on negligence, i.e., whether in exercising its
right to use so much of the surface as is reasonably necessary,
the mineral lessee acted reasonably.

Where the question in-

volves not the amount of surface, but how that space is used or •
where facilities are located, the test is still negligence even
in Texas under Getty. To hold otherwise would be to say that the
mineral estate is no longer dominant and put courts into the position of deciding how to operate oil wells.
S

Appellant submits that the Respondent cannot prevail in this

action on its claim that it is entitled to damages because of
y

the building of the access road, either under the law accepted
in all states other than Texas, or under the Getty rule.

The

Respondent in this case has not presented the kind of case Jones
did in the Getty case.

The record is barren of any evidence

presented by Respondent that any reasonable Alternative existed
to locating the access road other than where it was eventually
located.

The only evidence presented with regard to the reason-

ableness of the location of the access road in this case was pre-39-
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sented by Appellant.

In Getty, Jones showed that two reasonable

alternatives were available to Getty at the time the pumps were
installed.

Jones showed that those alternatives were reasonable,

usual, and customary in the industry, and that they were both
actually being used by other companies on lands owned by Jones.
Respondent in this case presented no such kind of evidence, no
evidence concerning costs, interference with irrigation water
were the road to be built from the north, safety, work to be required on the county road, and bridge or any other kind of factual analysis or expert testimony regarding the feasilbility of
using another way of access to the well site.

The sum total of

the evidence presented by Respondent on this issue was that he
did not want the road at all, but that if it had to come, he
wanted it to come from the north along the fence through the
swamp.

(TR. 66 & TR. of Hearing, January 28, 1974).
On the other hand, Appellant's evidence is uncontra-

dicted that an analysis of the conditions as they existed at
the time was made by Appellant's engineers and construction •
people, that calculations were made and alternatives discussed
(TR. 113, 114, 115 & 116) and that reasonable conclusions were
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Irawn from that analysis which determined that the location of
:he road at its present place interfered least with the flow ,.,
>f waters on the tract, was least expensive, used the least alount of Respondent's land, and in every other way was the most
•easonable access to the location.

(TR. 113 & 114) Unlike

n Getty where~thfecourt specified what it found to be, the reaonable alternatives to the beam-type pumps the trial court here
imply said:
"The location of the road where it was located was not
reasonably necessary and unreasonably interferes with
. the surface owner's pre-existing use of the surface11.
ere the trial court could specify no alternatives to'the location
f the access road because none were presented by Respondent and
ppellant's evidence showed that the only feasible location was
lere it was built. Appellant submitsuthat the evidence does
}t support a finding that Appellant had reasonable alternatives
) building the access road as it did.

:>--••?yyy-*^.^-

^r-.

Furthermore, if we apply the limitation of the Sun case to
te Getty rule of reasonable alternatives, those alternatives
LSt be limited to those available on the premises.

If the trial

oirt chooses to look at reasonable alternatives as in Getty, it
ould limit those alternatives to those-available on*the premises
-41-
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as stated in Sun.

In this case under that rule Appellant

k.A should not be required to go great distances to haul in fill
material to build a road from the north if fill is available
on Respondent's property any more than Sun should be required
to go off the premises and purchase water.

If Appellant were

to construct an access road from the north along the fence as
requested by Respondent, would not Appellant have the use of
fill material available on Respondent's property to do so?
tainly under the Sun case the answer would be yes.
mineral estate is not really the dominant estate.

Cer*

If not, the
To build the

access road from the north and use the fill material available
from Respondent's fields might be an alternative available although there is no evidence regarding that in the case.

If

that were to occur, Respondent's surface use would be more substantially interrupted than has occurred.

The building of the

road straight across the property from the county road to the
well site without making cuts or darning off swales was the simplest, least expensive, least detrimental approach that could
have been taken.

No evidence before the Court indicates otherwise

-ALTHOUGH THE COURT STATED THAT IT ADOPTED THE GENERAL CONCEPT
-42-
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OF THE LAW AS SET OUT IN THE CASE OF GETTY OIL CO. VS.vJONES
AS TO THE RELATIVE RIGHTS-.OF THE SURFACE AND MINERAL OWNEESi
IT ERRONEOUSLY APPLIED A POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE RULE INSTEAD
OF.THE .RULE STATED BY THE COURT : IK GETTY.
v,

Appellant respectfully submits that one need only read the

Memorandum Decision of July 1, 1975 which was incorporated into
thfe* Court's Finding of Fact and Conclusions of Law to see thak~
the trial court really did not apply the Getty rule in this. case.
Xn Paragraph No. 3 thereof, the court,,mentions in three places
what It calls the "possible alternative1* rule.

The Getty rule *

was not that of "possible alternatives11 r,.biiL^that of "reasonable
alternatives"* .Although it stated.it would follow the Getty
rule, the court really adopted what Respondent had urged J>elow,
the rule used,in condemning in easement of necessity wherein
the condemnor must take the alternative causing the least possir
ble injury to the land owner. A review of the evidence before
the-Court inescapably shows.that only: under that misconception
of the test to be applied .cauld the Court have reached the conelusions it did.
CONCLUSION
," Because of the.error by the trial court in computing damages to growing crops on the basis<of" the fair market value of
the lands involved and because of the lack of evidence to support
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The trial court's finding that Appellant acted unreasonably
in locating the access road to the well location, as well as
the obvious use by the court of a "possible alternative" rule
rather than a proper test of whether the use was reasonable
under the circumstances in reviewing the location of the access
road and for the further reason that the trial court failed to
afford Appellant the benefit of a written notice and sixty days
within which to correct any breach of covenant specified in
the notice, as required by the lease, the trial courtfs judg- r
ment should be reversed and this case remanded for a decision
in accordance with correct principles of law and the provisions
of the Oil and Gas Lease involved.
Respectfully Submitted, * • on'
\
*

" ; MCKEACHNIE & SEAGER
Gayle F. McKeachnie
Attorneys for Appellant
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